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the consent of the licensor.2 Section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code limits a debtor’s ability
to assume or assign a contract where “applicable law” excuses a non-debtor counterparty from
accepting performance from a third party.3 In interpreting applicable federal trademark law, the
Trump court noted that exclusive or non-exclusive trademark licenses are precluded from
assignment by a licensee without the licensor’s consent, even if the original license agreement
did not expressly prohibit such an assignment.4 The Court held that, under Section 365(c)(1) of
the Bankruptcy Code, trademark license agreements are not assumable or assignable by a debtor
licensee without the trademark owner's consent because they are not assignable under federal
trademark law. The court in Trump Entertainment also discusses in detail what type of
“applicable law” is relevant in the 365(c)(1) analysis.
I.

Hypothetical Test vs. Actual Test
Circuit courts vary with respect to which test to use for interpreting

Section 365(c)(1). When addressing the issue of whether a trustee can assume an executory
contract, courts that rely on Section 365(c)(1) have interpreted it in many different ways, thus
creating a split amongst the circuits.
a. Use of “or” instead of “and” in Section 365(c)(1)
Section 365(c)(1) prevents a trustee or debtor from assigning a contract without the
nondebtor’s consent if “applicable law” prevents the contract from being assigned outside

2

In re Trump Entertainment Resorts, Inc., 526 B.R. 116, 118 (Bankr. D. Del. 2015).
11 U.S.C. 365(c)(1) (“The trustee may not assume or assign any executor contract or unexpired lease of
the debtor, whether or not such contract or lease prohibits or restricts assignment of rights or delegation of
duties, if--applicable law excuses a party, other than the debtor, to such contract or lease from accepting
performance from or rendering performance to an entity other than the debtor or the debtor-in-possession,
whether or not such contract or lease prohibits or restricts assignment of rights or delegation of duties;
and such party does not consent to such assumption or assignment”).
4
In re Trump Entertainment Resorts, Inc., 526 B.R. at 125.
3
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bankruptcy without consent. Section 365(c)(1), however, uses the phrase “assume or assign,”5
as opposed to “assume and assign,” which seems to mean that a trustee or debtor cannot even
assume such a contract and agree to perform under it, even if the trustee or debtor has no
intention of assigning the contract to a third party. Courts that choose to apply the hypothetical
test read the word “or” literally, and conclude that unless applicable law allows a third party to
assume the contract, the trustee may not assume the assignment.6 Simply put, can the debtor
hypothetically assign the license even though it doesn’t want to (“hypothetical test”) or what is
the debtor actually proposing to do (“actual test”)?
The principal decision that utilizes the hypothetical test is from the Ninth Circuit in In re
Catapult Entertainment, Inc.7 In Catapult, the court relied on an earlier decision holding that a
non-exclusive patent license could not be assigned without the patent holder’s consent
and, adopting the hypothetical test, held that such a patent license also could not be assumed over
the patent holder’s objection. Most recently, the Nevada district court used the hypothetical test
and held that this precluded assumption, or assumption and assignment, of an intellectual
property license without the consent of the licensor, if the license is not assignable under nonbankruptcy law without consent of the licensor.8
The First Circuit used the actual test for its decision in Institut Pasteur, et al. v.
Cambridge Biotech Corporation, 9 which held that federal common-law and contractual
restrictions against assignment of patents did not preclude assumption of a patent by a chapter 11

In re Footstar, 323 B.R. 566, 570 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (questioning if the word “or” in the statutory
language “assume or assign” must “be read literally, i.e., as a disjunctive, or should it be construed in
context as the functional equivalent of the conjunction “and”).
6
In re Catapult Entertainment, Inc., 165 F.3d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1999).
7
Id. (collecting bankruptcy court decisions favoring the actual test).
8
N.C.P. Marketing Group v. BG Star Products, 337 B.R. 230 (D. Nev. 2005).
9
Institut Pasteur v. Cambridge Biotech Corp., 104 F.3d 489, 490 (1st Cir. 1997).
5
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debtor. If the debtor in possession has no intent to assign an executory contract to a third party,
the contract can be assumed if the debtor in possession meets requirements of section §365.10
Many courts have rejected the hypothetical test because it is inevitably contradictory to
the goals of chapter 11, which permit licensees to benefit from the protections of bankruptcy law
while encouraging maximization of the economic value of the estate. This unusual result allows
the non-debtor to be free of contracts simply because of the debtor’s bankruptcy filing.
Depending on the contracts involved, whether a bankruptcy court applies the hypothetical test or
the actual test can greatly impact a debtor’s ability to stay in business. Application of the
hypothetical test can prevent a debtor from continuing to exercise its rights under a
nonassignable contract, such as a patent, copyright, or trademark license, which generally cannot
be assigned without the licensor’s consent. The issue here is that some debtors may be incapable
of reorganizing under Chapter 11 without such contracts.
b. Is “trustee” synonymous with the term “debtor-in-possession” in section 365(c)(1)?
The court in In re Footstar, Inc. adopted a different test that rested upon the distinctions
between the debtor and the debtor-in-possession, and the bankruptcy trustee. The court reasoned
that the term “trustee” in section 365(c)(1) should not automatically be assumed as synonymous
with the term “debtor-in-possession,” such that the exclusion of assumption and assignment is
limited to situations where a trustee, rather than the debtor-in-possession, seeks to assume an
executory contract.11 Under this approach, the debtor-in-possession would be precluded from
assigning a contract because assignment would require the non-debtor to accept or perform the
contractual obligations to someone other than the debtor. However, under this approach, the
debtor-in-possession could assume the contract because the debtor-in-possession is not an entity

10
11

Id.
In re Footstar, 323 B.R. at 571.
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other than itself.
II.

Whether “cause” to lift stay exists under section 362(d) of the Bankruptcy Code

An issue arises when a non-debtor party to an executory contract is subjected to a long period
of uncertainty while the debtor determines whether to reject or assume the executory contract.
Under Bankruptcy Code §362, the non-debtor party generally cannot terminate the contract
unilaterally without moving for relief from the automatic stay. In Trump Entertainment, the
bankruptcy court considered section 365(c)(1) in the context of a trademark licensor’s motion for
relief from the automatic stay to continue state court litigation in which the licensor was seeking
to terminate a trademark license agreement with the debtor. Following the precedent in Izzarelli
v. Rexene Prods. Co.,12 Delaware bankruptcy courts typically apply a balancing test in assessing
whether “cause” to lift the stay exists under section 362(d) of the Bankruptcy Code. Under the
three-pronged test, the court considers: (a) whether continuation of the nonbankruptcy litigation
will cause great prejudice to either the estate or the debtor; (b) whether any hardship to the
nondebtor arising from continuation of the stay considerably outweighs the hardship to the
debtor; and (c) the probability that the nondebtor will prevail on the merits.13 Pursuant to the
binding standard set forth in West Electronics, courts in the Third Circuit are obligated to use the
hypothetical test when establishing whether a contract can be assumed.
In Trump Entertainment, the Delaware Bankruptcy Court adopted the “hypothetical test,”
a strict interpretation of Section 365(c) of the Bankruptcy Code.14 The Trump court concluded
that because the agreement was unassignable pursuant to non-bankruptcy law, the debtor could

12

Izzarelli v. Rexene Prods. Co. 141 B.R. 574 (Bankr. D. Del. 1992).
Int'l Bus. Machines v. Fernstrom Storage and Van Co. (Matter of Fernstrom Storage and Van Co.), 938
F.2d 731, 735 (7th Cir. 1991).
14
In re Trump, 526 B.R. at 125.
13
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not assume it.15 Under the hypothetical test, pursuant to federal trademark law, a debtor may not
assume an executory contract over the objection of the non-debtor even if the debtor does not
have any intentions of assigning the contract.16 The Court determined that a debtor in possession
may not assume an executory contract over the nondebtor’s objection if applicable law would
prohibit this assignment to a third party. However, the court noted that section 365(c)(1) must be
interpreted simultaneously with section 365(f)(1): “Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c)
of this section, notwithstanding a provision in an executory contract or unexpired lease of the
debtor, or in applicable law, that prohibits or conditions the assignment of such contract or lease,
the trustee may assign such contract or lease under paragraph (2) of this subsection.”17
Therefore, the bankruptcy court in Trump Entertainment concluded that, for section 365(c)(1) to
apply, the applicable law must specifically provide that the nondebtor contract party “is excused
from accepting performance from a third party under circumstances where it is clear from the
statute that the identity of the contracting party is crucial to the contract.”18
This case exemplified the importance of choice of venue when companies that are
licensees of intellectual property rights file for chapter 11.19 Many companies are incorporated
under Delaware law, and this fact allows them to seek bankruptcy relief in Delaware’s court
system even if their principal place of business is in another jurisdiction.20 One of the most
valuable assets in a corporate bankruptcy filing is the right of a debtor as licensee to use
intellectual property owned by a third party. Depending on the venue where the bankruptcy

15

Id. at 123.
See id. at 122.
17
11 U.S.C. § 365(f)(1).
18
In re Trump, 526 B.R. at 125 (citing In re ANC Rental Corp., 277 B.R. 226, 236 (Bankr. D. Del.
2002)).
19
See id.
20
Mathews, Susan, Corporate Chapter 11 Bankruptcies: The Case for Venue Reform; October 2014;
http://www.abfjournal.com/articles/corporate-chapter-11-bankruptcies-the-case-for-venue-reform/.
16
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petition is filed, the value of the debtor’s rights may vary greatly.
III.

Is an intellectual property license an executory contract?

Only contracts which are executory may be assumed, assigned, or rejected under Section 365
of the Bankruptcy Code. The Bankruptcy Code does not define the term “executory.”
Bankruptcy courts often cite the definition put forth by Professor Vern Countryman. Under the
Countryman definition, a contract is executory where both the debtor and the non-debtor party
have obligations that so unperformed that failure of either to complete performance would
constitute a material breach excusing the performance of the other.21 As a general rule, nonexclusive licenses of intellectual property are considered executory contracts, whereas exclusive
licenses are not.22 Whether sufficient performance remains due on both sides for the contract to
be executor is frequently a difficult question. Negative covenants (promise to not conduct
certain activities) have been determined to be sufficient to make a contract executory.23 Even the
common license agreement provision prohibiting the parties from suing for infringement has
been interpreted as sufficient for a license agreement to be considered as executory. 24
IV.

Effects of the split among the Circuits
The uncertainty among the circuits causes a debtor to question whether or not to file for

21

Countryman, Executory Contracts and Bankruptcy, 57 Minn. L. Rev. 439 (1973). See In re Texscan,
976 F.2d 1269; In re Select-A-Seat Corp., 625 F.2d 290 (9th Cir. 1980); In re Coast Trading Company,
Inc., 744 F.2d 686, 692 (9th Cir. 1984).
22
In re Golden Books Family Entert., 269 B.R. 300 (Bankr. D. Del. 2001).
23
See, e.g., In re Rovine Corp., 5 B.R. 402 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1980) (covenant not to compete
sufficient); Lubrizol Enters. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1985)
(technology licensor's duty to defend intellectual property rights, indemnify licensee and maintain
confidentiality sufficient); In re Select-A-Seat Corp., 625 F.2d 290 (exclusive licensor’s duty not to
further license held sufficient). But see In re Stein & Day, Inc., 81 B.R. 263 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988) (nondebtor author’s duty to indemnify publisher and offer future books for publication insufficient); see also
In re Monument Record Corp., 61 B.R. 866 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1986) (employment contract in which
non-debtor artists had no further obligation to record).
24
In re Access Beyond Technologies, Inc., 237 B.R. 32, 43-44 (Bankr. D. Del. 1999) (citing Everex
Systems, Inc. v. Cad Trak Corp. (In re FLC, Inc.), 89 F.3d 673, 677 (9th Circuit 1996).
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bankruptcy with the risk of not being able to assume an executory contract as a debtor in
possession. Particularly, this becomes important when the debtor is an entity or corporation.
As a business, the choice of venue is critical because the debtor would want to choose the court
that applies the test most suitable for its purposes. As mentioned above, the debtor in
possession was able to assume the license when the First Circuit applied the actual test.
However, the debtor in possession was barred from assuming the license when the Ninth
Circuit applied the hypothetical test.25 Depending on whether or not the debtor would want to
assume the license, and depending upon whether a debtor has multiple options as to where it
can file a bankruptcy case, it would serve its best interest to choose a venue that would apply
the test most beneficial to its outcome of choice.
Conclusion
According to the court in Trump Entertainment, the “applicable law” (in this case,
federal trademark law) states that licenses are not assignable without the licensor’s express
authorization. This general bar exists because trademarks are meant to identify a good or
service of a particular, consistent quality, making the distinctiveness of licensees vital to
licensors. The parties clearly did not intend to contract around this rule in the Trademark
License Agreement. Additionally, the licensor’s consent to assignment to the first lien lender
was not enough to overrule the default rule of non-assignability because it was only effective
with respect to an “isolated assignee” in the context of a state enforcement action that was
unlikely to ever occur once the bankruptcy case was commenced. The section 365(c)(1)
hypothetical test was therefore satisfied, and the court held that Trump AC was entitled to
relief from the automatic stay using the West Electronics case as precedent.

25

Id.
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Trump Entertainment exemplified the importance of choice of venue when companies
that are licensees of intellectual property rights file for chapter 11.26 There are many
companies incorporated under Delaware law and are able to seek bankruptcy relief in that
state’s court system even if their principal place of business is in another jurisdiction.27 If
this case was filed in a jurisdiction that did not follow the hypothetical test, then Section
365(c) would not have prevented the assumption of the trademark license, and there would
have been no relief from the automatic stay.28 The circuits that have ruled on the assumption
of executory contracts under Section 365(c)(1) are split. For various reasons, some courts
employ the “hypothetical” test while others employ the “actual” test. This split has caused
similar cases to have different outcomes, depending on where the debtor filed for bankruptcy.
In order to prevent different rulings on similar cases, either the Supreme Court needs to
decide the issue, or Congress has to amend Section 365(c)(1) to clarify the discrepancy.

26

See id.
Mathews, Susan, Corporate Chapter 11 Bankruptcies: The Case for Venue Reform; October
2014; http://www.abfjournal.com/articles/corporate-chapter-11-bankruptcies-the-case-for-venuereform/.
28
In re Trump, 526 B.R. at 120–21.
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